Russia: Facing the Future by Adam N. Stulberg
RUSSIA:
FACING THE FUTURE
A Report of Carnegie 
Corporation of New York
RUSSIA: FACING THE FUTURE
A Report of Carnegie Corporation of New York
By Adam N. Stulberg
©2001 Carnegie Corporation of New York
Cover image ©Image Farm Inc.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
From the Desk of Vartan Gregorian ii
Executive Summary v 
Introduction 1
Thinking Anew About U.S. — Russian Relations 5
The Dilemmas of Russia’s Transformation 9
Scenarios for Russia’s Domestic Development 27
Strategy for Extensive Re-Engagement 33
About the Author 40
FROM THE DESK OF VARTAN GREGORIAN
“Wretched and abundant, oppressed and powerful, weak and mighty, Mother
Russia!” the poet Nikolai Nekrasov wrote in 1876. His words still capture 
the nation’s contradictions, which challenge our comprehension of this vast
country. I would only add that Mother Russia is totalitarian and democratic, 
having replaced one with the other by government decree just a decade ago in an
astonishingly peaceful, and humbling, revolution. Americans cheered as great 
hunks of the Berlin Wall collapsed. But as time passed, the public grew 
increasingly impatient with the continuing struggles of the former superpower. 
Our lack of understanding first led to unrealistic optimism that Russia 
would rapidly complete its metamorphosis. Now, more darkly, our misunder-
standing could lead to an equally unjustified pessimism about Russia’s future. 
That pessimism, in turn, could misguide public policies in both nations for, 
as Socrates taught us, ignorance is the root of evil. 
Amid this climate of “Russia fatigue,” the Carnegie Corporation of New York
launched its Russia Initiative as a way to stimulate a fresh, critical appraisal and
public discussion of Russia and its transformation. The initiative created four
interdependent study groups; each was comprised of leading American and
Russian experts from universities, research institutes, businesses, journalism and
nongovernmental organizations. The groups analyzed Russia’s current predica-
ments and trajectory, focusing on the nation’s political, economic, social and
national security problems and their cumulative implications. *
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Under the direction of Thomas Graham, Alexander J. Motyl and Blair Ruble,
one team explored the connections between democratization, creating free 
markets and political stability. Guided by Bruce G. Blair, Clifford G. Gaddy and
J. Andrew Spindler, another team examined how economic decline has under-
mined Russia’s military capacity, while at the same time its security needs drain
the economy and thwart reform. Judyth L. Twigg and Kate Schecter led a third
group that examined the country’s depletion of human resources and its impact
on economic recovery and political stability. The final group, led by Robert
Orttung and Peter Reddaway, analyzed the overall cohesion and stability of the
Russian federation that sprawls across eleven time zones. I invite you to read the
enclosed report, which summarizes these experts’ findings and recommenda-
tions for constructive U.S. policies toward Russia.  
We must do our best to understand Russia, as our future depends upon it. 
Alexis de Tocqueville, that prescient observer, said as much in 1835. Referring 
to the United States and Russia, he wrote, “Their starting point is different and
their courses are not the same, yet each of them seems marked out by the will 
of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.” The knowledge offered here 
in our Russian Initiative will, I hope, help us on our way toward a peaceful, 
collaborative destiny. 
Vartan Gregorian 
President, Carnegie Corporation of New York
*  The complete text of the four original reports can be found on Carnegie Corporation of 
New York’s web site, www.carnegie.org
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vEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report focuses on the current paradox of Russia’s transformation: After
years of peacefully contending with the travails of decline and beginnings of
recovery, a quasi-democratic/quasi-market system has emerged in Russia that is
curiously stable in the short term, but distorts the processes of further reforms
and is ill-prepared to cope with the deep-seated, multi-dimensional socioeco-
nomic crisis that looms on the country’s horizon. The purpose of the report is to
present a pragmatic appraisal of the basic challenges and trajectory of Russia’s
transition, and a consistent set of recommendations for bolstering the effective-
ness of U.S. efforts to encourage successful transformation. Drawing on the
findings of four expert study groups that analyzed the cross-cutting effects of
Russia’s political, economic, social and national security transition, this report
examines the challenges and complexities confronting Russia’s path from 
dysfunctional to sustainable stability, identifying the critical national interests at
stake for both Russia and the U.S. in continued progress. It also assesses alterna-
tive scenarios for Russia, highlighting both the limits to radical democratic
transformation or fundamental authoritarian reversion, as well as the remaining
opportunities for modest but progressive change. The report then recommends
strategic guidelines for America’s “extensive re-engagement” of Russia that avoid
the pitfalls of either micromanaging or abandoning the cause of reform, while
building on realistic expectations of Russia’s internal development in light of the
challenges ahead and U.S. priorities. This strategy for “helping Russia help
itself” along the path of democratic and market-oriented reform calls for:
• Avoiding unilateralism;
• Reassuring Russia’s strategic and economic security;
• Promoting political transparency in Russia;
• Thinking strategically, acting locally;
• Reducing the costs of operating in the Russian market; and
• Improving the welfare of Russia’s future generations.
INTRODUCTION
Almost a decade after the implosion of the Soviet Union, contradiction, not
coherence, defines the state of Russia’s transformation. Caught between the 
pursuit of democracy and a lapse into authoritarianism, Russia today boasts
unprecedented political pluralism while simultaneously lacking the essentials of
transparent governance, separation of powers, disciplined political parties, or
“rule of law.” That the fate of Russia’s democratic transition now rests with
Vladimir Putin, an ex-secret service officer, symbolizes the irony. So far, Russia’s
invigorated but enigmatic president has managed to sustain the popular support
that capped the country’s first democratic transfer of executive power and has
installed a remarkably pro-reform government. Yet, he has sought to strengthen
weak state institutions by favoring a “dictatorship of law” that relies on the secu-
rity services to rein in independent-minded regional leaders, financial oligarchs,
and media outlets, and that jeopardizes the early achievements of reform.
Russia’s socioeconomic predicament also defies easy characterization. After years
that featured a collapse of industrial production and successive monetary crises,
there are encouraging signs. The economy grew an impressive seven percent in
2000 and the government adopted a balanced budget on schedule for the first
time. But this progress occurs against the backdrop of antiquated banking and
industrial systems, soaring capital flight, rampant corruption, and opaque prop-
erty rights and investor protection that continue to mar the prospects for
successful transition to an effective market economy. Stranger still, amidst the
spectacular degradation of the country’s human and social capital—punctuated
by the precipitous rise in mortality, drop in fertility, and wave of alcoholism and
infectious diseases— most Russians have remained either politically moderate 
or apathetic, shying away from mass displays of protest. 
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2Not surprisingly, these economic and social problems have affected the Russian
military. Dramatic and protracted funding shortfalls have eroded its industrial
base, stalled reform, and fostered widespread dissention and demoralization
across all levels and services. The sinking of the Kursk submarine in August
2000 exposed the sorry state of Russia’s armed forces. Because the military 
can no longer perform its traditional missions effectively, Russian leaders are
more resentful and attuned to perceived international threats, especially from
countries in the West that enjoy unprecedented dominance and are prone to
advancing their interests without reference to Moscow. With few conventional
avenues for reclaiming the country’s lost geostrategic stature and redressing its
security concerns, Russian leaders have embraced an assertive diplomatic
agenda and have become precariously reliant on an over-taxed nuclear deterrent
posture. These provocative “quick fixes” contribute to the acrimony in
Russian-American relations, and are becoming more burdensome and problem-
atic to sustain in the face of the country’s economic austerity.
Such challenges dispelled early hopes for a smooth transition to democracy and
market-based systems following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Disillusioned
by the protracted and difficult process of reform and wearied by the hardships it
has entailed, many Russians now harbor anti-Western sentiments and regard
foreign assistance with resentment and suspicion. For their part, Western lead-
ers have become disappointed and fatigued with the denouement in Russia.
Skepticism and the impulse to “forget Russia” are common results. The August
1998 financial crisis dashed illusions that Russia could be readily transformed,
and precipitated a fundamental shift towards retrenchment in dealing with
Moscow. The 2000 presidential election in the U.S. stoked this frustration,
prompting a partisan debate over missed opportunities that has left many in
Washington questioning the merits of partnership with Moscow and wonder-
ing, “Who lost Russia?” 
The very contradictions in Russia’s political, economic, and strategic behavior,
however, suggest that the current gloom about reform shared in the U.S. and
Russia is as overblown as was the optimism of the early 1990s. Even the partial
steps taken towards democratization, marketization and integration demonstrate
that Russia indeed is not “lost,” and that the obstacles to transformation, while
formidable, are not insurmountable. That impediments to liberalization and an
efficient economy have sprung up from within Russia also is not surprising,
given the harsh and deep-seated legacy of Soviet rule. It is simply misleading to
believe that the course of reform could be imposed from abroad or that Russia
has been left for America to lose. Consequently, the fundamental and more 
vexing problem lies not with the evidence of Russia’s erratic behavior or with
assigning blame for past failures, but with righting the disillusionment on both
sides and taking critical stock of the bilateral relationship.
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THINKING ANEW ABOUT U.S. — 
RUSSIAN RELATIONS
Despite the exasperation with the past and contradictions of the present, policy-
makers in Russia and the U.S. can ill afford to lose sight of common ground. For
Russia, the relationship with the U.S. is still critical for advancing the country’s
development. America’s capital, military power, influence over financial lending
institutions and its dominant presence in the world economy inevitably make
good relations with the U.S. vital to its modernization. By President Putin’s 
own appraisal, the costs of abandoning constructive dialogue with the U.S. are 
unacceptable, and Russia’s national interests are best served by integrating into
the global community. 
Confronting the opposite challenges of responsibly managing and sustaining 
its unprecedented dominance, the U.S., too, finds its own welfare and security
inextricably tied to Russia’s success at navigating a constructive course of reform.
Unlike during the Cold War, where U.S. security turned on Soviet military
strength, American interests today are directly threatened by Russia’s internal
weakness and incoherence. The economic distress and social trauma in Russia
have at once sharply raised the spectre of numerous perils: the dangers of 
inadvertent or accidental use of nuclear assets; the risks of leakage of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD); the environmental hazards of a nuclear meltdown;
the threats posed by organized crime and corruption; and the spillover effects of
instability at the heart of Eurasia. The relative significance of these dangers is
magnified not only because of Russia’s proximity to America’s vital interests in
Europe or issues related to nuclear security, but because the problems associated
with Russia’s weakness intensify the scale and scope of most other post-Cold
War threats confronting the United States. In addition, the U.S. stands to incur
significant opportunity costs, in terms of lost markets, resources, and human
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ingenuity from Russia’s continued exclusion from the international system. 
An isolated and vulnerable Russia also is more likely to lash out against its
weaker neighbors, putting at risk fledgling democracies and global access to
strategic resources in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. All of these concerns would
become more troublesome for the U.S. should Russian state power continue to
atrophy. Thus, the real question now confronting American policymakers is 
not “whether” but “how” to facilitate Russia’s successful transformation into a 
strong democracy.
The completion of presidential elections in both Russia and the U.S. presents 
a propitious moment for thinking anew about the complexities of Russia’s
predicament and creatively about forging a new relationship. No longer 
captivated by exaggerated expectations or campaign-driven debates, but tasked
with devising a new blueprint for strategy, both leaderships are well positioned
to reconceptualize an agenda for coping with the “post-honeymoon” phase of
U.S.-Russian relations. For the current U.S. administration, the time is ripe to
take a hard look at what Russia has become over the past decade, assay its trajec-
tory in light of the challenges ahead, and chart a new course for effectively
promoting the stable development of a democratic, market-oriented, and 
internationally engaged partner. 
In reconceptualizing this new stage of U.S.-Russian relations, Americans—
policymakers, opinion-leaders, and the general public—must be attuned to three
realities associated with Russia’s domestic transformation. First, Russia’s road to
reform will remain long and arduous. After a decade of experience it is evident
that the political, economic, and social transformation underway in Russia is of
historical proportions and is likely to extend over several more decades, even
generations. Unlike what occurred in Western Europe and North America over
hundreds of years, Russia is striving at once to create a new national identity,
fashion durable political institutions, develop an efficient market economy, and
cope with full-scale social renewal at a rapid pace and without resort to blood-
shed. Searching for “quick fixes” is instinctive and understandable but unrealistic
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and inappropriate for contending with the historical residue of Soviet and Tsarist
rule and the deep-seated challenges that lie ahead. Similarly, measuring Russia’s
progress in terms of the attainment of full-fledged democracy, markets and
global integration is shortsighted and unproductive. Because Russia is engaged
simultaneously in protracted processes of democratization, marketization, and
integration—marked by twists, turns and backsliding— success is relative and
reflected by the degree of movement towards these objectives. Therefore,
Americans should abjure reflexive impulses for reprimanding or excusing
Russia’s lapses, and take care to adopt realistic time horizons and benchmarks for
evaluating change.
Second, Russia’s transformation occurs against the backdrop of the trend
towards globalization that is unfolding rapidly at the dawn of the 21st century.
Globalization is a revolutionary force, beyond the control of any one state, that
increases the interdependence of national polities, economies and societies.
Because national policy choices are inextricably interconnected, it is imperative
for policymakers in both capitals to devote more resources to grappling with
shared problems and opportunities for promoting productive engagement.
Crises afflicting Russia therefore should not be analyzed from the perspective 
of a “zero-sum” game that translates Russia’s declining power as an inherent
benefit to American and international security. Globalization also renders classic
considerations of national security, defined solely in terms of balance of power
and relative military strength, anachronistic. America’s strength and security now
hinge, to an unprecedented extent, on its economic competitiveness, as well as
on the ability to mitigate transboundary threats posed by economic dislocation,
environmental degradation, spread of epidemic diseases, unsafe or insecure
WMD materials, adverse demographic trends and uncontrolled migration that
could be unleashed by the further breakdown of the Russian state. Thus, helping
Russia today is not a matter of altruism; it is an issue of self-interest and 
a national security imperative for the U.S. in an increasingly interdependent
global system. 
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Third, the profound problems in Russia’s economic, political, and social spheres
are interconnected. Observable deficiencies in social cohesion, political effec-
tiveness, economic development, financial transparency and national defense 
are tightly linked subsets of the overall crisis that besets Russia’s massive 
transformation. Americans must appreciate this interaction and adopt a broad
framework for making choices about the substance of future relations. 
Focusing on single policy angles or compartmentalizing issues with Russia
misses both the constructive and disruptive interplay of developments across
these various realms. An understanding of the critical synergies among the 
different dimensions to Russia’s reform is required before U.S. policymakers 
can devise responses that are likely to yield beneficial long-term results 
for American interests. 
Thus, the basic challenge for Americans at this juncture is to take a fresh look at
the situation in Russia and to plot a pragmatic but reinvigorated course for
engaging Russia and Russians as broadly as circumstances permit. The stakes are
too high for succumbing to exasperation with the disappointments of Russia’s
transition or with previous policy failures, and as a consequence defaulting to
strategies of abeyance, damage limitation, abandonment, or alternatively,
romantic rescue. To avoid these pitfalls and to better understand the most advan-
tageous forms of engagement for the future, American leaders must embrace 
a realistic and holistic perspective that takes into account the complexities, 
challenges, and likely scenarios attendant to Russia’s long and rocky transforma-
tion from fragile to sustainable stability.
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THE DILEMMAS OF 
RUSSIA’S TRANSFORMATION
At the onset of the new millennium, Russia looks fundamentally different from
the expectations and tumult of the early 1990s. Contrary to the hopes of Boris
Yeltsin and his allies at home and in the West, the country has not been rapidly
transformed into a liberal, federal democracy buoyed by a vibrant market 
economy and modern living conditions. Nor is Russia today on the brink of 
collapse, plagued by hyperinflation, embattled by mass social unrest, poised for 
a Communist reversion, or ripe for disintegration. Instead, Russia is locked 
in-between these extremes. The situation is curiously stable at present, charac-
terized by a conspicuous rebound from the financial meltdown in 1998 and the
emergence of a new system of mutually reinforcing political and 
economic relationships. Lacking essential features of an efficient market econ-
omy or transparent governance, this system nonetheless benefits both current
leaders and opposition movements enough so that they do not have incentives to
champion radical reform, and has not made the general population desperate
enough so far to compel the leadership to undertake such change. But because
the system thrives on the arbitrary use of power and distorts the processes 
of democratization and marketization, it remains highly dysfunctional and 
precariously positioned to cope with the deep-seated, multi-layered crisis that
looms on Russia’s horizon.
The Emergence of a Stable but Dysfunctional System
Throughout the 1990s, the Russian leadership was consumed with dismantling
the vestiges of the Soviet state and laying the foundations for a democratic and
market-oriented society. The crux of this strategy consisted of 1) marginalizing
those groups opposed to rapid political and economic reform; and 2) asserting
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the new leadership’s prerogatives to implement a liberal reform agenda even in
the face of widespread discontent. To realize their objectives amidst the lingering
hangover of Soviet central planning and Communist rule, President Yeltsin and
his team believed that the ends justified the means, and found it expedient to
polarize the domestic landscape into allies and enemies of reform. Following the
1993 violent dissolution of the parliament, they pursued these ends primarily
through the electoral process, breaking with the country’s long tradition of
authoritarian rule. The leadership moved resolutely to orchestrate change from
above by vesting the presidency with almost unlimited constitutional powers,
taming the opposition-led parliament, and transferring the assets of some of
Russia’s leading enterprises to a select group of private individuals. This new
class of “oligarchs” was expected to comprise a base of wealthy independent 
supporters to keep the Communists at bay and finance Yeltsin’s re-election 
campaign in 1996. 
In the process, however, Russia’s radical reformers failed to build a solid domes-
tic base for their efforts. Their disdain for the rest of society and forceful tactics
alienated both the Russian public and urban intelligentsia. At the same time,
their practices fueled “crony capitalism,” undermined government discipline,
and retarded the development of transparent political institutions and a middle
class of property owners who were supposed to provide the bedrock for a 
modern, democratic Russia. By the end of the decade, what started out as a series
of tactical maneuvers by Russia’s reformers, who were locked in an unavoidable
struggle to impose a naïve vision of the future on the country’s anti-democratic
and anti-market past, devolved into a new system of political and economic 
relations that has fallen far short of initial goals and expectations. 
What has emerged in the transition is a quasi-democratic Russian political 
system. The inter- and intra-elite contest for the spoils of victory over
Communism stripped the state of its oppressive powers to command the mobi-
lization of national resources, and draped it with attributes of a pluralistic society
and political system. A basic democratic constitutional framework now governs
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political activity, as people are free to vote, assemble, worship, and voice their
concerns to a greater extent than at any time in the country’s long or recent past.
Missing, however, are a political culture and formal mechanisms to ensure an
effective separation and balance of powers, or to cultivate a reliable commitment
to upholding the rule of law. While numerous political parties have emerged,
they are notoriously undisciplined and, except for the Communist Party, lack the
machinery to reflect more than the personal aspirations of their leaders.
Similarly, the Russian mass media, although obstreperous and free from official
censorship, is still weak and vulnerable to selective harassment by overbearing
state managers, provincial authorities and financial backers. 
In this new system, the full democratizing effects of elections and new freedoms
are fundamentally obstructed by the dramatic erosion, fragmentation, and
parcelization of state power. Like feudal Europe, the current Russian state 
represents a decentralized, but strongly hierarchical political and social structure,
comprised of a multiplicity of self-interested but weak localized power centers.
The central government lacks the formal capacity to provide transparent, stable
mechanisms for adequately guaranteeing basic rights, enforcing laws, protecting
property, or maintaining social welfare. Federal institutions are devoid of disci-
pline or effective oversight, and have been captured by a narrow circle of
unaccountable political insiders, functionaries and aggressive businessmen who
compete for influence. Civil society is too weak and impoverished to serve as a
check on this activity. In practice, political power at the highest level is exercised
arbitrarily via corrupt, informal, personal networks that are oriented primarily
towards balancing the parochial and predatory interests of a small clique of 
well-connected officials and private actors. 
The decentralization of state power is also manifest in the new set of federal
relations that have taken root in Russia. Notwithstanding two gruesome wars in
Chechnya, there is little enthusiasm for separatism, with ethnic and political
groups remaining mostly demobilized across Russia’s 89 constituent regions. 
At issue with “regionalism” today is the appropriate distribution of political
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jurisdiction and discretionary control over the allocation of economic resources.
With the emergence of directly elected regional leaders and the representation
of their interests in the upper house of parliament, center-periphery relations
have evolved from open confrontation to political compromise. Accordingly,
Russia has functioned as an “asymmetrical” federation, comprised of ad hoc
bilateral power-sharing agreements negotiated between regional subjects and the
center. With center-periphery relations established on a contractual rather than
constitutional basis, the balance of power between Moscow and the regions 
fluctuates according to the level of political will in the Kremlin, with federal
executives prone to trading regional autonomy for political support when
embattled at the center, and independent-minded provincial authorities 
generally reluctant to assert de facto control over legal, economic, and foreign
policies in their localities during periods of political resurgence in Moscow.
Thus, the striking features of the current Russian political system are the 
blurring of public and private spheres of authority, emergence of informal and
opaque mechanisms for exercising authority, and the absence of a single 
dominant political force at any level of state and society.
At the same time, the Russian economy has devolved into a quasi-market system.
On the one hand, the process of economic transformation has turned a critical
corner. In contrast to the free fall of the early post-Soviet period, by the end of
2000 the economy boasted a growth rate of over seven percent, inflation rates
that have been reduced by half since 1999, and industrial production rates that
have grown by 13 percent since 1997. National reserves have more than doubled
since 1999, as the ruble has appreciated relative to the dollar, and the country has
run a growing trade surplus over the past two years. The state is no longer
responsible for coordinating commercial transactions, and successive govern-
ments have been reluctant to embrace economic paternalism. After enduring 
the pain of successive monetary crises, the country’s leaders seem to have learned
that they cannot borrow their way to prosperity, and that they must work hard 
to increase tax revenues, reduce the foreign debt and keep government 
spending under control. Together, these changes have sowed the seeds for 
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the emergence of young, constructively motivated, and managerially capable
entrepreneurial class.
On the other hand, an integrated system of complex and efficient market 
institutions is conspicuously absent in Russia. Financial markets exist, but they
have failed to mature into a self-correcting system of savings and investment that
is responsive to rational monetary policies for promoting economic growth.
Instead, economic activity is concentrated in quasi-autarchic networks that rely
on non-monetary, barter and artificial exchange controls to isolate and protect
themselves from bankruptcy and other disciplinary pressures associated with
nascent national and global market pressures. This “virtual economy,” fueled by
heavy energy subsidies to industry, enables these informal networks to thrive and
promote exchanges outside of the cash economy. As a result, the exercise of
power and authority in both business and government is highly personalized,
nontransparent and arbitrary. 
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, this new system in Russia is surprisingly
stable, in the sense that it generates a set of mutually reinforcing political and
economic relationships that favor the status quo. First, the very dispersal of
power among rival elites, bureaucrats, financial oligarchs and regional leaders
prevents any one group from dominating the system. The fragmentation of
power insulates each group or region from the problems or ambitions of the
others, localizing unrest and minimizing the consequences of crises at the center
for the system as a whole. 
Second, most Russians do not have strong inclinations to orchestrate change.
Because their power and welfare are firmly rooted in the opaque and idiosyn-
cratic networks that prey on the weak political and economic structures, elites
and their rivals inside and outside of government are motivated to preserve the
existing system. A profound cultural fear of instability, combined with weak 
societal outlets (i.e., political parties, nongovernmental organizations and the
media) and the protracted “pauperization” of the Russian population, sap the
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energy for organized protest throughout Russian society. Under conditions
where the vast majority of Russians are consumed by the immediate needs of
making ends meet and do not expect greater participation in decisionmaking,
political activity becomes a very risky distraction.
Third, the current Russian system has been effectively sanctioned by the West.
For much of the last decade, Western policymakers and advisors were willing to
overlook many gross violations of democratic norms and human rights, rampant
social misery and half-completed economic programs in the hopes of encourag-
ing a narrow group of favored Russian leaders to press on with reform against
the wishes of the majority in the legislature and without much popular support.
Critics of reform in Russia were collectively dismissed as Communist holdovers,
national xenophobes, or corrupt parasites that had to be marginalized even at the
expense of delivering foreign assistance to the Yeltsin team under dubious 
circumstances. This not only damaged the image of the West, but galvanized the
national opposition to radical reform and weakened the base of committed 
supporters for building democracy and market-oriented institutions in Russia. 
The harsh reality is that the emergence and maintenance of this new system has
mutated the course of democratization and marketization in Russia. The weak-
ness of the state, while not precluding a democratic society, obstructs its
development. The stability derived from the resort to informal, personal and
arbitrary political networks breeds the corruption that militates against the 
institutionalization of constitutional, criminal, or civil legal procedures. The 
perpetuation of backroom dealings distorts implementation of formal checks and
balances and credible law enforcement, undermining the Russian people’s faith
in pluralistic institutions and the rule of law in the process. Stability and 
incrementalism, not democracy and change, have become the focal points of
state building for Russian politicians and citizens who are consumed by the
immediate tasks of working informal channels just to get by, and are loath to
make additional sacrifices in the name of “reform.”
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The emergence of numerous local economies, and the overarching proclivity for
autarchy and idiosyncratic valuation systems discourages structural economic
reform. These factors nurture corruption and extortion, generating barriers to
imports, foreign investment, entrepreneurship, and the free flow of goods and
services across local markets, as officials and state managers collect rents through
the rationing of permissions, allocations, and protections. Given that property
rights are inconsistently protected by a weak court system, and that tax collec-
tion remains capricious and arbitrary, there are strong incentives to ignore legal
remedies and to allow immediate consumption to take precedence over investing
in the country’s obsolete and woefully inefficient infrastructure. Ironically, such
incentives have only strengthened with the upturn in the economy since 1998.
Because the strong recovery is due largely to soaring global energy prices, the
devaluation of the ruble (which priced competing foreign goods out of the
national market) and large energy subsidies to domestic industry, it masks struc-
tural deficiencies and encourages the continued reliance on discretionary forms
of import substitution at the expense of forging ahead with market reform. 
So far, the main features of President Putin’s program have reflected the 
contours and contradictions of the new system in Russia. On one hand, there are
signs that the new president has both the public support and political commit-
ment to push through needed reforms. Putin has stayed true to the basic
democratic fabric of the Russian constitution, riding a popular approval rating of
70 percent with promises of “strengthening the state” and improving the effec-
tiveness of the government to defend civic, political and economic freedoms. He
has forged a cooperative working relationship with the Duma, the lower house
of parliament and has pushed legislation aimed at reforming the development of
national political parties. He has also put Russia’s super-wealthy business tycoons
on guard by cracking down on tax fraud and assailing their political influence. At
the same time, Putin has maneuvered decisively to change the tone of federal
relations and limit the most extreme abuses of local authority. He has tried to
deal with corrupt governors by making the Kremlin stronger via the appoint-
ment of seven special envoys to oversee the implementation of federal policies in
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the regions, amendment of membership in the Federation Council, passage of a
law that provides for the temporary dismissal of a regional leader under investi-
gation for wrongdoing and attempts at bringing regional laws into conformity
with superior federal laws. Similarly, Putin, who campaigned for the presidency
without articulating a clear economic strategy, has moved quickly to codify a 13
percent flat tax and champion the cause of land and banking reforms.
Notwithstanding these changes, the new president’s political tactics and policies
remain tightly constrained by the dysfunctional attributes of Russia’s feudalistic
system. Putin’s power over policymaking remains boxed in by private deals
aimed at balancing between unaccountable political forces that include loyalists
in the security services, as well as members of the Yeltsin clan, economic reform-
ers, oligarchs and the governors. This has produced a disturbing default to
arbitrary and quasi-authoritarian methods for intimidating select oligarchs and
recalcitrant regional leaders, and for threatening the free flow of information via
traditional media outlets and the Internet. Putin also has demonstrated in
Chechnya that he is personally prepared to wage war at home and to condone
the military’s crimes against humanity in order to stop terrorist attacks in Russia
and to preserve the country’s integrity.
Whether President Putin will succeed as a caretaker of the current Russian 
system or will become his own man and begin to advance reform is too early 
to tell. But given the persistence of the system, his policies, at least in the near 
term, most likely will be hemmed in by the political imperatives and pathologies
that are internally generated. This is especially problematic as Russia 
confronts several closely interrelated quandaries that are perpetuated by the
fragile institutions currently in place and that ultimately lie at the crux of the 
country’s trajectory.
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Moving from Dysfunctional to Sustainable Stability
The most fundamental and pressing challenge for Russia’s continued transfor-
mation is to transcend the dysfunctional stability of the current system to break
the “vicious circles of weakness” that are distorting the potential complementar-
ity of nation building, democratization, marketization and international
integration. Russia is confronting multiple subsets of tightly linked social, polit-
ical, economic and national security problems that are emasculating the sense of
national purpose, confidence and commitment needed to take the appropriate
risks to further the process of transformation. While none of these mounting
woes have yet come to a critical head, the compound effects are of crisis propor-
tions, as together they are rapidly draining the health of Russia’s society and
crippling the state’s capacity to meet its most basic national security and welfare
responsibilities. If left unabated, this mutually reinforcing set of negative trends
not only risks shattering the fragile stability of the current system, but throws
into question the sustainability of Russia’s development and modernization over
the coming decades. 
Crisis of Social Capital and Cohesion
One of the most devastating consequences of Russia’s painful transition has been
the alarming degradation of health and social conditions. Since the collapse of
the Soviet Union, Russia’s total population has declined by three percent, with
the death rate now surpassing the birth rate by over 50 percent. The Russian
birth rate is down more than one child per woman since the late Soviet period,
due less to conscious decisions to defer childbearing during difficult times than
to the steady increase in infertility that has left 15-20 percent of Russian married
couples unable to reproduce. This rise of infertility has been mostly the conse-
quence of multiple (and frequently botched) abortions and a surging incidence
of sexually transmitted diseases. At the same time, Russian life expectancy at
birth dropped 3.2 years from 1987 to 1998, and has only partially recovered
from the transition period low of 64 years in 1994. The increases in adult male
mortality have been particularly shocking, climbing to 50 percent among men
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ages 45-54 from 1990 to 1993. Male life expectancy patterns have remained sig-
nificantly lower than during the Soviet period (almost 15 years lower than in the
U.S.!), and have been characterized by an erratic recovery, subject to repeated
and dramatic drops that to date mask the direction of this vital indicator. 
An extremely ominous aspect of this demographic crisis has been the impact on
Russia’s youth. The major difference between current Russian mortality patterns
and those during the Soviet period is the exceptionally high death rate of young
adults aged 15-35 from violent causes, soaring alcoholism, acute cardiovascular
conditions and precipitous rise in the spread of infectious and parasitic diseases.
Russia now ranks among the top ten countries in the world for drug-resistant
tuberculosis infections and has experienced a doubling of the mortality rate for
the disease over the past five years. The accelerating threat of HIV and AIDS
from intravenous drug use is even more alarming, with Russia forecasted to be
home to one million HIV-infected people by 2003, even before the expected
“second wave” of heterosexual transmission takes off. The cumulative impact of
these trends is jarring, and has lead to apocalyptic predictions that there may be
only 80 to 100 million people left in Russia by the year 2050, down from 148
million in 1996.
Compounding the social traumas of the nation’s winnowing population and
deteriorating health is the fact that 30-45 percent of the Russian population now
lives in poverty. This shocking situation is due mostly to declining incomes and
increasing income disparities, delays in payments of wages and benefits, and
unemployment, all the result of the economy’s overall decline. The single 
decisive factor associated with the increase in poverty is the birth of an additional
child. This, in turn, has fueled an alarming increase in the number of abandoned
children, the vast majority of whom are “social orphans” cast out or neglected by
their living parents who have lost the economic or psychological wherewithal to
care for their offspring. The rise in poverty also has sparked waves of divorces
and child abuse that have compelled children to turn increasingly to crime and
prostitution simply as avenues for survival.
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Together, the crises in Russian health and living standards have produced a
nationwide loss of social cohesion and social capital. The virtual collapse of the
highly flawed but comprehensive Soviet welfare system unleashed a torrent of
social problems. At the same time, it deprived Russian society of the critical 
formal institutions, trust, networks, associations and communities to draw on for
managing the recovery and ensuring the country’s future competitiveness. The
weakness of state institutions has lead to the granting of massive tax exemptions
and competition among select lobbies for dwindling social subsidies. Together,
these activities have undermined the capacity of the government to perform
basic social welfare services, stymied initiatives to restructure the social benefits
system and eroded public support for the very market reforms needed to develop
a new social safety net. The economic crisis of the transition period also stripped
large enterprises of the resources to support hospitals, housing, vacation and
rehabilitation centers. It has also made it very difficult for regional authorities,
private citizens, professional associations, charities and churches to step in to
provide alternative sources of social cohesion. In the face of the present social
crisis Russian families are no longer able to cope effectively to compensate for
the breakdown in state-based and group-based social safety networks. It has 
been left to often charismatic, but woefully under-funded local leaders and 
private sources to offer ad hoc “band-aides” to redress deteriorating social and 
health conditions. 
The erosion of social cohesion in today’s Russia has created a vicious circle.
Worsening health conditions, the breakdown of the nuclear family, the paralysis
of state institutions, and the myriad of other social crises facing Russia continue
to escalate and feed upon each other. This, in turn, undermines the social fabric
that is crucial for revitalizing the nation’s determination and material capacity
needed to develop viable political institutions, efficient market mechanisms and
a stable defense posture, or to avert a social explosion that would inevitably
reverberate far from Russia’s borders. 
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Fragmentation of National Identity and Institutions
Complicating the process of transition in Russia is the vicious circle formed 
by the absence of a unifying national identity, a crumbling state, inefficient 
economic mechanisms and elements of nondemocratic development. With the
collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has been forced to confront its historical
legacy as an under-developed nation. This ongoing struggle to define the
Russian civilization and mission—as uniquely Russian, Eurasian, Western, or
some combination thereof—weakens the idea of political community and
deprives the state of a powerful source of legitimacy and popular mobilization.
The absence of a strong national consciousness also undermines pride and 
consensus in state building and leaves both officials and private citizens with few
incentives to act in a principled manner. Lacking commitments to upholding or
adhering to the formal rules of the game that come from a strong sense of
national and civic responsibility, it is increasingly difficult for Russian state 
officials or members of society to extract themselves from arbitrary political and
economic practices. 
The weakness of the Russian state, in turn, accelerates economic decline by leav-
ing the country without effective institutions to support market activity, eroding
the quality of public goods (such as health, education and economic infrastruc-
ture), and creating an opening for organized crime. The weak state also loosens
the institutional underpinnings—rule of law and a civil society—necessary for
producing a stable democracy. In conjunction with declining social capital and
the absence of a coherent national identity, this motivates Russian leaders to rely
heavily upon personal connections and loyal cadres (especially in the security
services) for state building and allocating economic resources.
This process is compounded by the inefficiencies of a nonmarket economy.
Socioeconomic decline deprives the state of the resources it needs to rebuild the
capacity to govern effectively and delegitimizes democracy in the eyes of the
population. Economic deprivation and the intense competition for scarce
resources also feed traditional exclusionary and aggressive elements of Russian
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nationalism that, in turn, provides the grist for anti-democratic and anti-
Western political movements in Russia. 
Finally, authoritarian attitudes and rule undermine the pursuit of a market 
economy by raising the costs and risks of entrepreneurial undertakings that
implicitly jeopardize the informal economic and political relations that are 
in place. Authoritarian practices both generate and require an impulse to manip-
ulate national symbols and elements of patriotism for the instrumental purposes 
of exercising and maintaining political power. Sadly, this is the one area in 
which Putin has chosen to break the vicious circle of weakness. This is reflected
by the leadership’s embrace of national pride to justify the arbitrary approach to
recentralizing state authority, and the resort to an overtly chauvinistic public
campaign to garner support for the Chechen war. The initial appeal of both 
suggests that Russians increasingly believe that doses of authoritarianism and
patriotism may provide the panacea for the weak state and thus the shortest
route to Russia’s recovery. However, merely strengthening the instruments of
coercion and paying lip service to patriotic obligations are not enough to stimu-
late the sense of social justice, ideological conviction, or material incentives 
that are needed to fashion viable democratic institutions and an efficient 
market economy. 
Ad hoc Federalism
Compounding the challenge of political development over the past decade has
been the ad hoc competition for executive power between Russia’s weak state
institutions at the federal and regional levels. Notwithstanding the president’s
strong constitutional powers, the federal government has lacked an effective
chain of command to implement its policies or to maintain an integrated eco-
nomic space across the country. Locally based federal offices have been poorly
staffed and deprived of the resources needed to run social welfare programs, col-
lect taxes and enforce national laws efficiently. Federal employees instead have
been vulnerable to co-optation by regional authorities that are able to provide or
withhold housing, office space and additional perquisites. Accordingly, federal
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control has been problematic and increasingly reliant on arbitrary methods for
leveraging personal connections, intimidating opponents, exploiting inter- and
intra-regional rivalries and exercising selective fiscal coercion. 
At the same time, the weakness of federal institutions has enabled the governors
to be self-sufficient and to arrogate state sovereignty to themselves, as if Russia
were a confederation, not a federation. Unaccountable to federal authorities or
to local constituencies, regional administrations often have exploited natural
resources under Moscow’s legal jurisdiction, applied electoral procedures that
violate federal law and legislated on topics constitutionally reserved for the cen-
ter. On occasion, they also have imposed restrictions on the performance of
military service and conducted unauthorized foreign policy. But because most
regions lack independent sources of revenue and depend on internal trade for
energy and foodstuffs, they have also resorted to lobbying Moscow for assis-
tance. In this context, the central dilemma for state building is to tighten vertical
discipline within federal hierarchies and to hold the governors accountable to
the people and the law, while simultaneously vesting regional administrations
with sufficient autonomy to address issues in their jurisdiction without arbitrary
federal interference. 
So far, however, this balance has not been achieved. Putin’s recentralization pro-
gram, premised in part on the use of ad hoc and selective methods for wresting
federal power from the regions, is undermining the cohesion and effectiveness of
the state. New reforms aimed at reducing the national stature of the governors
by depriving them of their seats in the Federation Council, the upper chamber
of parliament (and immunity from arrest), may end up actually increasing the
governors’ discretion in federal policymaking. As compensation for this legisla-
tion, the governors effectively acquired the right to fill the upper chamber of
parliament with full-time lobbyists for their regions and also retained a voice in
federal politics via ex officio membership in the newly created State Council.
However, Putin appeared to score a psychological victory with the passing of a
new law that gives the president the right to temporarily remove a governor
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under criminal indictment. Yet, it is not clear what this even means in practice,
and the political quid pro quo to get it passed by the federal parliament dealt a
blow to local democracy as all elected mayors, except those in regional capitals,
are now subject to dismissal by the governors. 
Putin’s aggressive attempt to recapture locally based federal machinery by creat-
ing seven huge federal districts also potentially exacerbates the problems of
arbitrary decisionmaking. By appointing envoys that report directly to the 
presidential administration and stand above the governors, the reform adds an
extra layer of bureaucracy between the federal and regional governments. This
risks further complicating coordination between the center and the regions, and
obfuscating the boundaries of political and administrative authority. That Putin
opted to appoint five of the seven representatives from the security services and
military and delegated to them substantial discretion for deciding how to use
their new authority, also augurs for the continued dominance of personality over
institutions in Russian state building. To the extent that these unelected officials
succeed in usurping powers away from the governors, the less accountable
regional decisionmaking will be to local interests and the more likely cronyism
and arbitrary rule will persist unchecked at yet another level of the federal
bureaucracy.
In addition, the use of massive force in Chechnya has failed to bring the repub-
lic back under Moscow’s authority. With no end in sight, the war has alienated
potential allies in Chechnya and in other Muslim communities at home and
abroad, created martyrs among the Muslim fundamentalists throughout the
North Caucasus, and aroused nationalistic and religious anxiety among non-
Russian peoples across the country. The net effect has been to increase the
danger of anti-Russian terrorism throughout the county. 
Finally, Putin’s reforms have complicated constructive interaction between civil
society and state institutions at the regional level. The methods used to make
regional police forces, prosecutors, and judges beholden to the national 
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government and the new federal district chiefs appear to be focused more on
politicizing local law enforcement than on reducing the amount of corruption at
the regional level or encouraging an independent judiciary. Heavy-handed 
tactics for imposing a “unified information space” in each federal district, 
tightening media licensing procedures and manipulating media subsidies appear
to be part of a multi-pronged strategy for substituting federal for local control
over media outlets. Furthermore, the Putin leadership is not encouraging the
formation of real grass-roots political parties, and is proposing a new Labor
Code that threatens to strip many of the rights that unions currently enjoy and
to render workers more dependent than ever on the mercy of their employers. 
Globalization and National Security
As a result of globalization, Russia’s security considerations, traditionally defined
by its military capabilities to defend, deter and coerce a foreign adversary, are
being superceded by concerns of economic competitiveness. The trajectories of
Russia’s economic recovery, growth and national security have become inextrica-
bly linked and associated with the country’s capacity to compete in and benefit
from international markets for goods and services. Access to international capital
and information is now imperative for achieving the economic growth necessary
to sustain the cohesion of Russia’s society and polity. Such international integra-
tion is critical for generating the economic development needed to modernize
and strengthen the national defense base. The key to reaping these benefits rests
with increasing the country’s financial and political transparency. Transparency
and globalization go hand in hand, as globalization requires information, and
financial transparency assures access to information. Therefore, a core challenge
for Russia is to muster the confidence necessary to develop a viable, efficient,
and transparent market economy that, in turn, will foster international engage-
ment, spur domestic growth and bolster the state’s capacity to perform its core
security functions. 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, Russia has been forced to 
confront these pressures of globalization with few and decreasing resources at 
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its disposal. Accordingly, the trinity of imperatives—guaranteeing transparency,
economic growth and national security—has been irreconcilable. Consequently,
the profound problem accompanying Russia’s massive transformation has been
the tightening of a Gordian Knot of austerity created by the interaction of
decline in the economic and security spheres.
At base, Russia’s economic decline has taken a large toll on every segment of the
country’s defense establishment over the past decade. The dramatic plunge in
funding allocated to defense has crippled Russia’s ability to conduct such tradi-
tional missions as air surveillance, defense of airspace and territory and border
control. Funding shortfalls have also been responsible for the anemic state of
Russia’s nuclear forces, as well as the operational and social disarray that afflicts
the national defense industrial base as a whole. The delay in economic develop-
ment has paralyzed military reform that, in turn, has degraded morale and
national pride, as well as undermined Russia’s sense of security.
At the same time, the deterioration of the Russian defense sector has generated
painful negative externalities for the economy and the country’s global outlook.
The collapse of the defense industrial base has deprived the economy of a major
source of its highest technologies and most promising cutting-edge research. As
a result, Russian policymakers are inclined to embrace arms exports as a panacea
for staving-off bankruptcy and the brain-drain in the defense industrial sector,
often to the detriment of Russia’s long-term security interests and relations with
the U.S.. In addition, the clash between the country’s lost military stature and its
historical role as a great power has aggravated Russia’s insecurity and suspicions
of other states and international financial markets that are apt to behave 
without concerns for Russia. This, in turn, has made Russian policymakers wary
of international integration and very reluctant to improve political and 
financial transparency. 
The failure to undertake significant banking reform, however, compounds
Russia’s economic and security dilemmas. The absence of a healthy and efficient
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banking sector has prolonged dubious monetary policies, discouraged domestic
savings and obstructed the process of credit extension needed to stimulate
Russia’s economic growth. The limited disclosure of information concerning
corporate governance and the arbitrary decisionmaking in the political and 
economic spheres, have failed to satisfy the Western security and banking 
communities. As a result, Russia’s opaque financial and political practices 
continue to restrict access to the very international engagement needed to drive
economic development, revive social cohesion, and stabilize the national 
defense base.
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SCENARIOS FOR RUSSIA’S 
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT
Over the next decade, there are four general courses of development that are
open to Russia: (1) accelerated democratization and marketization; (2) authori-
tarianism and state capitalism; (3) stagnation; and (4) modest but progressive
change. The likelihood and implications of success for each approach vary in
light of the above challenges that Russia confronts as it strives to make the 
transition from dysfunctional to sustainable stability.
Accelerated Democratization and Marketization
One scenario is for Russia to forge ahead with a radical, systematic program of
democratization and marketization. Russia already possesses a significant level of
political pluralism and competing interests represented by regional elites, oli-
garchs, civic forces and the media. Over the past decade, thousands of elections
for local and federal office have taken place, making them an accepted artifact of
normalcy for the Russian public. That Russia’s youth constitutes the backbone of
the electoral support for reform suggests that generational politics could be on
the side of deepening economic and political freedom. Notwithstanding the 
narrow capital accumulation so far in Russia, it is conceivable for a new entre-
preneurial class to surface with strong incentives to improve financial and
political transparency and to cultivate the emergence of a middle class capable of
pressing for genuine market and political reform. 
Such developments, however, would require almost an epiphany on the part of
the current Russian establishment that is unlikely to occur anytime soon. The
Russian constitution acts as a formal impediment to adding robust checks and
balances and curbing the default to informal policymaking. It does this by simul-
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taneously concentrating substantial but not dominant executive authority in the
presidency while dividing the legislature and government at all levels. In prac-
tice, because the Russian president enjoys significant extra-constitutional
powers over other political actors—i.e., parliament, functionaries, political 
parties, governors and business elites— the chief executive has little interest in
introducing genuine democratic or market reforms that would jeopardize these
advantages. At the same time, these subordinated actors can tap informal 
networks to increase their political and pecuniary privileges, thus they too are
disinclined to establish formal restraints on political or economic rent-seeking.
Finally, the trust between Russia and the West has sufficiently deteriorated over
the past few years to undermine the confidence in Moscow and interest among
foreign investors that would be necessary to open up the country to a massive
infusion of international capital and assistance to sustain the reform process.
Authoritarianism and State Capitalism
An alternative scenario of radical transformation would build upon the current
disillusionment with reform and humiliation of decline by embracing a heavy-
handed program for combining authoritarian state building with a dirigiste
economic and industrial strategy. This would entail rolling back human rights
protections; emasculating the independence of an already cowed media; and
exploiting political parties, a pliant Duma, subordinated courts and the prosecu-
tor’s office as instruments of political manipulation for imposing strong rule.
Also included would be a “second phase” of re-centralization that would prey on
weak regional institutions to transform Russia into a unitary state. This would be
complemented by a decisive crackdown on “unauthorized” entrepreneurship
and attempts to regain state control of large industry, and the energy, natural
resource and infrastructure sectors. In this scenario, the military sector would be
revived and tapped as the locomotive for resuscitating the moribund industrial
base and reemploying the bulk of the population. Such a program would 
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resonate with the aggressive patriotism sparked by the second war in Chechnya
and popular support for stability, as well as would derive sustenance from Putin’s
widely heralded campaign to impose stability via a “dictatorship of law.”
Notwithstanding the ominous signs of reversion and the outward sympathy for
resurrecting “fortress Russia,” there are significant obstacles to a successful
authoritarian and dirigiste course. Such a program would simultaneously squan-
der scarce economic resources due to its inherent inefficiencies and foster the
entrenchment of a closed, parasitic, and hyper-bureaucratized political system
that would not fare well in the face of the pressures of globalization. As is the
case with a radical liberal reform agenda, neither current elites nor their opposi-
tion are inclined to endorse a costly reversion to dictatorship that could put 
at risk their privileged status. To date, Russian executives have been loath to 
support a reversion to state paternalism or a complete concentration of power
that would, in turn, hold them directly responsible for the misery and ineffec-
tiveness of the state. These self-interested concerns will likely continue to
constrain future power grabs, given the significant social, political, strategic 
and economic costs attendant on forcing through a dramatic recentralization of
power and authority.
Stagnation 
A third, more realistic approach would be to resist structural reform and 
perpetuate the quasi-feudal system in Russia. In this scenario, the key institu-
tions of informal, nontransparent, and ad hoc political and economic
decisionmaking would be maintained. Any marginal attempt at reform, as 
evidenced by the measures adopted by Putin so far, would focus primarily on
improving discipline and redistributing scarce resources and influence within the
constraints of the existing system, albeit among a small, unaccountable and
rotating group of political and commercial kingpins.
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Although this represents the course of least resistance in Russia today, its 
continued pursuit could lead to dire consequences. Succumbing to stagnation
would perpetuate both the political and economic distortions of the current 
system, as well as the profound and interlocking problems associated with the
“vicious circles of weakness.” In the short term, the cumulative effect of uncon-
trolled decline in social capital, political effectiveness, structural economic
reform and transparency would be to arrest any potential for democratization
and marketization and, given the weakening of the state, would provoke increas-
ingly erratic foreign policies. Such inertia also would make Russia especially
vulnerable to outside shocks that could risk escalating relatively minor 
problems—sparked, for instance, by a natural disaster—into a full-scale crisis. 
Over the long term, the failure to redress the continued erosion of state power
implicit in this scenario could eventually unleash instability of crisis proportions
inside Russia, along its immediate borders, and across the international system.
The enfeebled state could compel regional leaders to go it alone, both politically
and territorially, fostering the breakdown of Russian federalism and the loss of
central control over the country’s foreign and security policies, including the
nuclear arsenal. This creeping disintegration could also destabilize states such 
as Georgia and Azerbaijan, that have been especially vulnerable to the spillover
effects of the turmoil in the North Caucasus; as well as states such as Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, Belarus, Estonia and Latvia, where large Russian minorities could
easily become the targets of irredentism and national assertiveness. State 
breakdown would also raise the global threats linked to the uncontrollable
spread of WMD materials and infectious diseases and could turn Russia into an
arena of international competition for neighboring states and the 
world’s leading powers that, in turn, might exacerbate the pressures for the
country’s disintegration. 
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Modest But Progressive Change 
The fourth scenario is for Russia to push the limits of the current system by 
pursuing a modest course of democratization and marketization. Taking advan-
tage of the recent upturn in the economy, cooperative executive-legislative
relations and Putin’s unprecedented popularity, the focus of reform would be on
consolidating the successes of the past decade while broadening the base of 
support for future reforms. In the near term, this would entail a concerted effort
aimed at stimulating domestic property ownership and cash transactions in the
economy by improving fiscal and political transparency. Specific attention would
be paid to simplifying the tax system and separating tax enforcement from bank-
ing and local government administrative systems, as well as to passing national
legislation aimed at facilitating production sharing agreements, protecting
investor rights, and furthering land and banking reforms. In addition, there
would be a conspicuous attempt to strengthen the legitimacy of an independent
judiciary and law enforcement system by restricting executive interference 
with court proceedings and rulings, and reconciling the most egregious 
contradictions between federal and regional laws.
Beyond the promotion of specific policies, this scenario envisions the gradual
activation of new constituencies with stakes in promoting more viable and 
efficient social institutions that, at present, are immature and only beginning to
enter the Russian political and economic arenas. Even in the current dysfunc-
tional system there are pockets of Russian society where fundamental principles
of democracy and market economics have taken hold to promote step-by-step
change. Against the backdrop of globalization, there are key elements within the
government, including President Putin and his economic advisors, who
acknowledge that Russia’s transition to a modern, internationally respected
nation is contingent upon meeting the basic requirements for financial trans-
parency that would be needed to unlock foreign investment in Russia. Economic
expansion also would presumably strengthen and embolden these forces, as well
as provide new opportunities for some of Russia’s emerging business elites to
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expand their wealth at home, and possibly abroad. By doing so, these actors will
obtain greater stakes in playing by global rules of the game in their economic
and political endeavors. 
In addition, there are charismatic local politicians, nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), and private entrepreneurs who have spearheaded grassroots
responses to severe social problems. These local initiatives have, so far, been lim-
ited to filling important niches—such as providing child assistance centers,
modern medical facilities, and regional health insurance—but through their own
success and appeal could be fortified to offer social and political relief on a larger
and more systematic scale. Finally, there are the younger generations of Russian
business and political leaders, lacking the ideological baggage of the Soviet past
but excluded from the opportunities for quick enrichment or influence, who will
begin to clamor for changes in the existing political and economic order. If cul-
tivated appropriately, these social forces could gain momentum and together
could serve to hold in check potential reversions to authoritarian methods of
state building that would threaten the integrity of reform altogether, while
prodding Russia gradually along a democratic and market-oriented trajectory.
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STRATEGY FOR 
EXTENSIVE RE-ENGAGEMENT
What can the U.S. do to effectively promote economic modernization, democ-
ratization, and international integration, given the realities of the current system
in Russia and its ominous trajectory? This analysis suggests that while the 
decisive impetus for extricating the country from its “vicious circles of weakness”
must come from the Russians themselves, American leaders—from government,
business, foundations and (NGOs)—should embrace a strategy of “extensive 
re-engagement” to facilitate the process where possible. This strategy requires a
reinvigorated attempt to “engage” both Russia’s state and society, as opposed to
either standing on the sidelines, or alternatively, micromanaging the process of
reform. The primary focus of this engagement should be placed on: a) building
international trust to encourage transparency in Russia; b) ensuring that the
attempts at state building do not reverse the previous achievements of reform;
and c) nurturing the development of bottom-up pressures for continued democ-
ratization, marketization and integration in Russia. At the same time, the
strategy should be “extensive,” aimed at cultivating a broad constituency for
reform among the Russian population, including segments that are nascent 
supporters of reform, as well as those that are traditionally resistant to change.
This strategy for “helping Russia help itself” along the path to democratic and
market-oriented reform is not “mission impossible” for the U.S., but requires
patient and close adherence to a few basic guidelines and related policies.
Avoid Unilateralism
It is imperative that the U.S. avoid presenting ultimatums or imposing its own
policies and style of reform on Russia. The credibility of U.S. advice and 
assistance stands to increase if they are grounded in the realities of Russia’s 
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current system and are nurtured by the Russians themselves. Moreover, it is 
critical that the U.S craft a common approach towards Russia with its allies in
Europe, as the relationship is likely to be tested by developments in Russia over
the coming years. Geographic proximity and greater vulnerability could compel
Western Europe to seek ways to accommodate Russia’s state building and pref-
erence for ensuring stability, while driving the U.S. to seek more forceful
avenues for reversing potential challenges to the core values of democratic and
market-oriented reforms. The cohesiveness of Western institutions could very
well be weakened in such circumstances. Therefore, the U.S. and Europe must
develop a united front for assessing tradeoffs between the different facets of
reform, and impress upon Russian leaders that an effort to exploit differences
between the allies will retard their own country’s integration into global institu-
tions, thus jeopardizing the viability and effectiveness of domestic political and
economic structures. This message should be conveyed on the one hand, by 
supporting Russia’s entrance into international financial and trade organizations
where it could be a credible member, such as the World Trade Organization; and
on the other hand, by resolving differences with European allies regarding the
division of labor between NATO and new European Union security structures.
Reassure Russia’s Strategic and Economic Security 
The U.S. needs to recognize that it can precipitate a critical break in the “vicious
circles of weakness” and foster transparency in Russia by avoiding provocative
behavior that readily feeds Moscow’s insecurity and adopting policies that 
underscore the benign effects of an open international system. The U.S. must
remember that the foreign policies it pursues are viewed through a prism of 
insecurity by a weak Russia and thus are prone to generating reactions within the
country that are otherwise avoidable. Accordingly, U.S. leaders must reassess 
the presentation, if not the substance of its policies, so as not to appear 
unambiguously aggressive which, in turn, risks exacerbating Russia’s own 
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insecurity, provoking a defensive response and subjecting the country’s internal
reform to unnecessary and unreasonable burdens. On the security front, this
suggests that the U.S. should redress the dominant foreign policy irritants for
Russia by championing the normalization of NATO-Russian relations via 
redefinition of the alliance’s mission and delaying its expansion to the East; and
by placing development of a National Missile Defense on indefinite hold, or at
least until the technological feasibility of a system is no longer widely questioned
and a concerted diplomatic effort is made to convince the Russians that the 
system will not undermine their nuclear deterrent. In addition, the U.S. should
seek to promote transparency through engagement by upgrading Cooperative
Threat Reduction assistance for decreasing the size and increasing the
safety/security of Russia’s inventory of nuclear weapons and materials. This pro-
gram should be complemented by new cooperative defense initiatives targeted at
developing joint early warning systems, coordinating nuclear de-alerting, jump-
starting nuclear stability talks, creating regional nuclear safeguards, developing
joint theater missile defenses, and establishing new mechanisms for addressing 
common threats of WMD proliferation, terrorism, and organized crime.
On the economic front, the U.S. should seek to allay Moscow’s insecurities by
facilitating nondiscriminatory debt relief and market access for products that
Russia can produce competitively at home. At the same time, the U.S. should
underscore to Russia that the sustainability of such gestures critically depends on
the avoidance of a unilateral default on its foreign obligations and the realization
of concrete steps towards economic, political and military reform. Washington
also should resist the temptation to provide Russia with credits specifically ear-
marked for the purchase of U.S. products (such as grain), thereby obviating
domestic reforms in key sectors (e.g., agriculture) and undercutting Russia’s 
economic relations with its own neighbors. 
Finally, the U.S. should assist Russia in resolving the war in Chechnya and stabi-
lizing the region as soon as possible. This would require striking a delicate
balance between 1) reassuring Russia of the U.S.’ benign intentions by unequiv-
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ocally supporting the integrity of the federation and condemning Chechen
zealots and terrorists; and 2) not condoning Moscow’s brutal violations of human
rights by making it clear that waging a war that does not distinguish between
combatants and civilians ill serves a country seeking to join the western commu-
nity in the 21st century. Washington also should coordinate the formulation of a
multilateral stability pact for the region with a loose grouping of states. 
Promote Political Transparency in Russia 
Taking care not to impose Western values or policies, the U.S. should induce
Russia to take the lead in opening up its political system. One set of tactics
should be to encourage business development funds to finance the debts of 
independent and viable media outlets and to provide material support for 
indigenous organizations that agitate for press freedom. Similarly, the U.S.
should encourage the sanctity of the rule of law by providing grants and techni-
cal assistance to those Russian organizations that seek legal remedies for
establishing and protecting property rights, due process, press freedoms, crimi-
nal rights and minority rights. The U.S government should also adopt stringent
guidelines for regulating the behavior and establishing a code of conduct for
American agencies and business operating in Russia that would set examples for
best practices, reduce the negative social externalities of unrestricted American 
commercial activities and dispel Russian perceptions of double standards. 
In addition, American organizations, together with East Central European 
partners, should create “east-east” exchanges and dialogues to expose anti-
reform journalists and political movements in Russia to experiences with
successful adaptation in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic; and to
engage them in discussions with former opponents of reform in those countries.
Ultimately, however, U.S. donors should disavow providing detailed recommen-
dations or oversight of political reform initiatives, and confine their roles to
offering general advice and assistance. By establishing general benchmarks but
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leaving the details of formulating and implementing specific programs to the
Russian government and private sector, U.S. agencies would give Russian 
recipients a sense of ownership and commitment to reform, while reducing the
risk of American assistance to be discredited in the process. 
Think Strategically, Act Locally 
In an effort to reach a larger segment of the Russian population, and to
strengthen and sustain internal checks on the abuse of power by informal and
corrupt political networks, U.S agencies should target assistance and training
programs directly at the grass-roots, nongovernmental, regional and private 
levels in Russia. Amidst the distortions generated by the current system in
Russia, there have been local success stories of reform that offer instructive 
lessons and potential models for adaptation and replication. In the public health
sector, for example, local officials have partnered with grass-roots movements
and NGOs to diagnose local health problems and to design and implement
locally defined quality control standards in hospitals and clinics. In order to
stimulate other such initiatives and to make them more effective and durable, the
U.S. government should provide an umbrella coordinating mechanism to 
support and facilitate the replication of low-cost partnerships between American
social service NGOs and new Russian counterparts, including local Russian 
government-private ventures. In addition, U.S. agencies should support a broad
array of training, education, systematic data collection, and professional
exchanges for a well-trained cadre of promising Russian policy analysts and
technical specialists in the health and social sectors. These programs would be
designed to produce a “train the trainers” effect, providing opportunities for the
study and observation of Western practices, and the subsequent incorporation of
new lessons into the training and practices of Russian professional communities. 
In addition, the U.S. should quietly seek ways to facilitate cooperation between
NGOs, the private sector and the different levels of the Russian government by
drawing on its own experience in developing state capacities through interaction
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with civil society. Regional transparency should be advanced by providing civil
society groups with the training and resources required to conduct independent
financial audits of fiscal exchanges across the different levels of government, to
monitor the effectiveness of regional reform initiatives and to disseminate the
results in the local media. In the process, however, the U.S. should avoid select-
ing regional “favorites” or backing local autocrats, and take care to encourage
flexible center-periphery relations and engage small grass-roots groups that have
a record of honesty and reliability in tracking the use of Western funds by federal
and local government offices. The U.S. also should take the lead in efforts to
upgrade the monitoring of regional and federal elections in Russia by supporting
local efforts to publish more and timely information about specific campaigns
and legal violations.
Reduce the Costs of Operating in the Russian Market 
In order to promote entrepreneurial activity across Russia, U.S. organizations
should focus their efforts on reducing the artificial barriers and transaction costs
of exchange. Rather than funding specific programs, the emphasis should be
placed on improving the opportunities for small and medium-sized businesses to
enter and survive the domestic market. At the macro-level, U.S. government
programs should target technical assistance, credit and investment to strengthen
infrastructure projects in Russia that are intended to support the free flow of
goods and services within a single economic space. These large-scale initiatives
should be reinforced by policies directed at improving the environment for small
business development. This should include extending small business investment
loans based on the models of Central European Funds and the Russian Small
Business Fund (currently supported by the EBRD) that would enable thousands
of local businesses to sustain themselves, as well as strengthen the capacity of the
Russian banking system to operate independently in the small business sector. 
In addition, efforts aimed at spurring the self-organization of small businesses
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should be concentrated on establishing vibrant chamber of commerce structures,
promoting grass-roots movements that agitate for deregulation, and supporting
stronger enforcement of contracts. 
Improve the Welfare of Russia’s Future Generations 
As part of accepting that the transformation in Russia will be a protracted
process, the U.S. should target assistance and partnership programs towards
reinvigorating Russia’s youth. In today’s Russia, the children have been hit hard
by the precipitous economic and social decline but have no political voice. Their
health and general welfare, however, are crucial to the productivity and vitality
of Russia’s future. Therefore, U.S. assistance programs should be directed at
boosting the welfare, expectations and behavior of Russia’s future generations.
This could be realized, for example, by funding public-private partnerships
aimed at developing alternative foster care networks to handle the thousands of
children in crisis situations and creating “directly observed treatment” centers 
to replace over the long-term the outdated and over-burdened orphanage and
tuberculosis hospitals, respectively. Together with support for improving
Russian higher education—via the funding of partnerships with American 
educational institutions, “train-the-trainers” projects for Russian policy analysts
and professors and “virtual connections” between Russian and international
researchers—modest American public and private contributions can make a 
significant difference in Russia’s long-term course of development. Without
assistance, Russia’s “lost generation” and its successors cannot provide the
human capital the country will need to sustain its transformation into a modern
democratic state, successfully integrated into the global economy and 
community of nations. 
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Try to imagine what life would be like had the United States government declared
in 1991 that democracy and capitalism were bankrupt experiments. That, in the
space of three years, the dollar became worthless, factories and farms closed,
Social Security dissolved and most people lost their life savings. Imagine reliving
the Great Depression, where physicians grow their own food to survive, school
teachers are paid with cases of bourbon for use as barter and parents become so
desperately helpless they entrust two million children to orphanages. As this
societal chaos unfolds in your mind, try to imagine America’s disintegration—as
a dozen states secede from the Union, the nation loses its superpower status and
defaults on foreign debts. And abroad, our European allies switch allegiance,
turning their backs on us and embracing our Cold War enemy.
If you can imagine this nightmare then you have a sense of what the Russian
people have been living through.
Since the end of the Cold War, the world has changed at lightening speed, but
politics and policies have been slow to change, distorting the prospect of peaceful
relations between Russia and the U.S.—which even now have thousands of
nuclear missiles, on hair triggers, aimed at each other. There is an international
gap in trust and understanding.
Carnegie Corporation of New York, in its 90-year pursuit of international peace
through the spread of knowledge, has produced Russia: Facing the Future, the
enclosed video documentary and scholarly report on Russian society today. With
words and pictures, the package paints a vivid portrait of Russia’s economic,
political, military and social upheaval—as well as Russian anxieties about national
security, fueled by the West’s sometimes warm, sometimes cold welcome. 
This package represents more than a year’s work by filmmakers and scholars 
in Carnegie Corporation’s project, which is called the Russia Initiative. Four task
forces, each with a multidisciplinary array of Russian and American experts,
assessed Russia’s economy, military, democratic reforms, societal problems and
possible futures, ranging from the fragmentation of the Russian Federation 
to the reimposition of Soviet-era totalitarianism. The scholarly papers were
synthesized into the enclosed volume and they provided the intellectual substance
for the documentary. 
